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Abstract. Cybersecurity awareness training has a bad reputation for
being ineffective and boring [21]. In this paper, we show the contrary,
namely that it is possible to deliver effective cybersecurity awareness
training using e-learning. We provide a general methodology on how to
create cybersecurity awareness training and evaluate it based on Kirk-
patrick’s model of evaluation [22]. We have conducted a pilot study of
the methodology in context of the European Parliament election 2019.
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1 Introduction
Organizations rely on their staff for protection of their assets. No matter how
many security polices are put in place, security always comes down to how the
individual employee behaves. In March 2016, for example, the personal Google
mail account of John Podesta, a former White House chief of staff and chair of
Hillary Clinton’s 2016 U.S. presidential campaign, was compromised in a data
breach accomplished via a spear-phishing attack allegedly carried out by foreign
Nation State. Allegedly, Podesta’s assistant, following the advice of a security
technician, complied and followed the instructions contained within the phishing
mail [20].
Therefore, to protect an organization from security breaches, it is vital to pro-
tect the technical and organizational infrastructure including sensitive data and
prepare users, employees, consultants, and guests to recognize and defend against
cyberattacks. In this paper, we focus on the human factor. Social engineering
attacks, where an adversary exploits human traits, such as modesty, altruism,
empathy, and diligence of a victim to gain access to restricted resources, steal
secrets, or causes other kinds of havoc. It seems natural that the only way to pro-
tect an organization against this kind of attack is by sharpening a user’s common
sense and the ability to recognize, react, and mitigate an imminent attack, and to
install a designed behavior in connection with security [15]. Therefore, education
is an important part of creating a security culture in organizations [6]. However,
cybersecurity awareness training has the reputation of being ineffective [2].
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Not wanting to accept this conclusion, we set out in this work to demonstrate
that cybersecurity awareness training for short-term retention of knowledge, for
example for election officials, can be made effective. The hypothesis of our work
is that one of the reasons for the perceived ineffectiveness is that cybersecurity
training is often unspecific, explaining concepts abstractly, such as confiden-
tiality, integrity, and availability that are good to know, but often not directly
relevant and difficult to translate into practice. Instead such training must be
methodologically relevant, consistent, role-based and continuously adopted to an
ever-evolving threat landscape [21].
As a corollary, effective cybersecurity awareness training can only take place,
after a rigorous security analysis of the attack surface, the entire security con-
text, and the security background of the target audience, i.e. users and course
participants, has been conducted. These findings must inform the learning objec-
tives of the cybersecurity awareness training, not more and not less. Concretely,
in this paper, we develop a methodology consisting of a few easy to follow steps
to prepare tailored security training for a particular target group to be deployed
in a well-defined security context.
We evaluate this methodology empirically, in the context of the European
Parliament election 2019, held in Denmark. In close cooperation with Copen-
hagen municipality, we conducted a security analysis of the voter identification
system, deployed in each of the 53 polling stations in Copenhagen, and pre-
pared an e-learning course for 53 election officials, the digital election secretaries,
responsible for all technical equipment used in the polling station. The course
was organized in modules, each tailored to the security needs of the election offi-
cials. All participants had to take an entry exam before the training and a final
exam after the training. We could demonstratively measure a significant increase
in cybersecurity preparedness for this limited target group election officials.
The cybersecurity awareness training was administered as part of the general
training of election officials, who are recruited within the municipality, some
having served in this role already several times before. Election officials have to
undergo training before each election, and the knowledge gained in the training
is usually necessary only for the day of the election. In general, election officials
were grateful to have the opportunity to learn about the attack surface. Long-
term retention of knowledge was not measured. To our knowledge this is the first
systematic study of e-learning with the short-term retention of cybersecurity
knowledge.
The literature [21] defines three levels of security awareness: perception, com-
prehension, and projection. Perception is to be aware of that there are potential
security risks. Comprehension is to understand and assess the dangers of security
risks. Projection is to be able to anticipate future situations and how to act on
potential security attacks. Based on our pilot training and the evaluative statis-
tical analyses we conclude that cybersecurity awareness training for short-term
retention delivered on all three levels of security awareness.
This paper is structured as follows. In Sect. 2, we discuss human factors in
cyber security. In Sect. 3, we then design a methodology for designing cyberse-
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curity awareness training to be delivered through e-learning. Next, we present
a pilot study for the European Parliament election 2019 and an evaluation in
Sect. 4 before we conclude and assess results in Sect. 5.
2 The Human Factor
The attack surface of any system includes technical as well as human com-
ponents. No system is stronger than its weakest component [5], and arguably,
human performance is recognized as a critical part of securing critical infrastruc-
ture [5]. Depending on the adversary’s objective, social engineering will always be
considered as one way to achieve the goal: As opposed to technical cyberattacks
that exploit vulnerabilities and always leave traces in log files or other media,
social engineering is considered a viable alternative which allows adversaries to
break a perimeter and operate somewhat undetected. In general, it is also more
difficult to attribute a social engineering attack to an adversary. Therefore, mea-
sures to prevent or decrease the negative impacts of cybersecurity breaches must
include all processes, policies and actors involved [7]. Technology alone cannot
create a secure environment, since human factors are an integral part of any
system, for example, during configuration, operation, or use. According to 2020
Verizon Data Breach Report social attacks are used in 22% of all cases recorded.
These attacks are almost evenly split into phishing and pretexting attacks [4].
There are many factors that influence the security behavior of users i.e. the
user’s respective rank in an organization, their respective personal values, and
their common sense regarding security [15]. Users are often not aware or do not
consider the vulnerabilities in an organization, they make mistakes or are tricked
into giving away sensitive information [1]. Therefore, common sense regarding
security in an organization must be taught [15] and training in cybersecurity
awareness is an important part of creating a security culture [1].
However, there seems to be a problem with existing cybersecurity awareness
training as it does not change behavior as expected [2]. There are several reasons
that this is the case. Firstly, cybersecurity awareness training is often designed
as too general without a clear target group in mind, leading to users not finding
it relevant. Secondly, incorrect assumptions about the targeted users and their
skills and motivation tend to make cybersecurity awareness training too general.
3 Training Design Methodology
Next, we describe a methodology for how to create cybersecurity awareness train-
ing that avoids the above mentioned factors by tailoring training to a well defined
target group and focusing the training content on what the target group need
to know and nothing else. The methodology consists of five steps, which are
summarized in Fig. 1.
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1. Target group
– Define the target group, target setting, tasks, and responsibilities
2. Risk assessment
– Define the adversarial environment
– Define assets, including physical and logical, and processes
3. Threat modeling and risk analysis
– Model the entire socio-technical system using CORAS/attack trees
– Derive and prioritize potential attacks
– Derive the attack surface and tailor it for the target group.
4. Training materials
– Base training on knowledge gained from (1.-3.)
– Create an e-learning platform
– Consider using videos, audio, games as part of the training
5. Evaluate training
Fig. 1. Training design methodology
3.1 Target Group
The first step of creating good cybersecurity awareness training is to identify and
characterize the target group, the target setting, and the target group’s tasks
and responsibilities in this setting. This can be achieved by ethnographic studies,
long-time observation of work practices, and study of available procedures and
documents. Usually, it is not sufficient to base this analysis only on printed
materials, as common work practices often deviate from the described processes.
A target group must be homogeneous, meaning all members should be assigned
the same tasks and the same responsibilities. Heterogeneous target groups are
not considered in this paper.
3.2 Risk Assessment
The next step is to identify assets and processes that are at risk, and define the
security policies that should be enforced [3]. A good starting point for the risk
assessment is to explore notions such as confidentiality, integrity, and availabil-
ity, and refine them on demand. It is absolutely crucial that the target group
identifies with this assessment. The cybersecurity training must be perceived as
relevant by the target group for it to be effective.
A part of the risk assessment is the attack surface of the infrastructure,
for which cybersecurity assessment training is to be offered. This presupposes
a clear picture of the adversary’s capacity and the adversary’s objective. The
attack surface includes all aspect of the infrastructure to be protected, includ-
ing technology, networked computing equipment, air-gapped equipment, access
control, cryptographic key distributions, physical access etc.
With the risk assessment in place, the next step is then to identify the weak
points in the infrastructure that an adversary could exploit and to define the
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role of the human to detect attacks and protect assets and processes. These
insights and this knowledge form the basis of understanding of the infrastructure
and feeds into the design process of the training materials, of which attacks
participants should learn to spot, and which procedures they should learn follow
to neutralize threats effectively.
3.3 Threat Modeling and Risk Analysis
In our experience, modern threat modeling tools, such as CORAS [16], attack
trees [17] or even attack-defense trees [14] are useful tools to explore the threat
model of any socio-technical system in a systematic and complete way. The
CORAS method is a defensive risk analysis approach where the Unified Modeling
Language (UML-diagrams) is used to model the target of the analysis. Unwanted
behaviors are drawn as threat scenarios. The CORAS method comes with tool
support, in particular, there exists a tool that supports drawing and analyzing
diagrams. Alternative ways of conducting security analyses and modeling threats
are described in this survey article [11]. In this paper, however, we focus on attack
trees as a modeling tool.
An attack tree is a mathematical tree-like structure that organizes threats
and attacks against a system. The root of the tree comprises the goal for the
adversary, and the leaf nodes denote the different actions an adversary can exe-
cute to achieve this goal. Each node in a tree can be seen as a subgoal. The
disjunctive “OR”-node represents alternatives, i.e. if one of the subtrees is suc-
cessful then so is the subgoal. In contrast, the a subgoal rooted in a conjunctive
“AND”-node is successful if an only if all subtrees are successful. There are also
other variants of attack trees, that could in theory be considered, for exam-
ple those supporting sequential conjunctions. The methodology presented here
applies as well. The visual representations of “OR”-nodes, “AND”-nodes and
leaf-nodes are depicted in Fig. 2.
Fig. 2. Explanation of nodes in attack tree
Attack trees are known for their ability to express socio-technical systems
and model human factors. We will be using them as well in our pilot study for
securing polling stations during the European Parliament election 2019 that we
describe in the Sect. 4.
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3.4 Training Materials
Next, we identify the critical elements of the analysis and translate the attack
tree into suitable training materials. We proceed in four steps, tagging, normal-
izing, prioritizing, and finalizing.
Tagging: When normalizing an attack tree, all information about the structure
of the inner nodes, i.e. OR and AND nodes is lost. In practice, however, it is
useful, to tag such inner nodes with keywords that help structure the content
of the training materials, and collect them during the normalization procedure.
Possible tags include, for example, social engineering attacks, man in the middle
attacks, attacks against air-gapping, SQL-injection attacks, cross-site scripting
attacks, buffer overflow attacks, and so on. An example of tagging can be seen
in Fig. 3.
Fig. 3. Example of tagging sub-trees
Normalizing: Hereafter, the attack tree is normalized as to create a list of attack-
chains in plain text. Attack-chains only include leaf nodes. Correspondingly the
normalization procedure is augmented, to derive an additional tag-chain, of all
of the tags that were encountered while constructing the attack chain. Below
A and T are normalized attack-chain/tag-chain pair displaying the fragments
derived from the attack tree depicted in Fig. 3:
A = { . . .
Say You Need It For A Valid Purpose,
Change Guidelines To Include Wrong Phone Number,
Phishing Attack
. . . }
T = . . . , Social Engineering, . . .
The above step should result in a number of attack/tag-chains pairs. Duplicate
attack chains should be removed while their tag-chains should be merged.
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Prioritizing: Next, we identify precisely the topics that should be covered in the
training materials. We therefore correlate the attack-chains with the tasks the
target group is in charge of to determine what parts of the attack-chain, if not
all, need to be included. It is critical for the training to be effective to educate
the target group exactly in the topics they need to know - nothing more and
nothing less. We use the tag chains as a guide to structure and organize the
material.
Finalizing: In this last step, we create new or update existing training materials
to create a consistent product. Recall that the success of effective training is to
make sure the target group attains three levels of awareness of security risks,
namely perception, comprehension and projection [21]. We propose to use e-
learning as platform for the training, since interactive and adaptable material i.e.
videos, also called hyper media-based material, can lead to effective cybersecurity
training [21] and motivation for learning through such a platform tends to be
high. Prior research has shown that video-based training is preferred over other
methods and yields better results [1,18]. The length of the video is important to
get the participants engaged, and a study shows that videos that are 0–3 minutes
have the highest engagement [9]. The training videos developed should train the
target group to observe, identify, react, and defend against the individual steps
laid out in the attack chains. Training material can be rearranged and reused
for other target groups.
3.5 Evaluating E-learning
The final step of our methodology is that of evaluation. It is good practice
to document the effects of security awareness training, to analyze the training
objectively, and to measure the efficiency and effectiveness of it. Evaluation can
help create a common understanding about the human factor defense capabil-
ities, which areas of understanding among the target group are sufficient, and
identify weaknesses that need to be strengthened [8].
Choosing an evaluation model to evaluate e-learning is dependent on the
scale and the time frame of the e-learning. The state of the art is described
in an article by Tripathi et al. [23] where four different evaluation models are
described in depth. We found that more models could be used in our case, and
many of the models don’t differ that much when measuring short-term effects,
as we do. If we had to measure long term, we would have to go back and look
at the evaluation models again. The two best models for our purpose are CIRO
or Kirkpatrick’s model of evaluation.
The CIRO model does not take the behavior of the learners into account
and is, therefore, thought to be better suited for management focused training
rather than for people working on lower levels of organizations [23,24], therefore
we chose to use Kirkpatrick’s model of evaluation.
Kirkpatrick’s model of evaluation was introduced in 1959. The model eval-
uates outcomes of training programs at four levels: reaction, learning, behav-
ior and results. Reaction addresses how the participant felt and reacted to the
training experience. Learning measures to which extent knowledge has increased
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and how intellectual capability has changed from before the training. Behavior
measures how the participant has changed behavior and applied the learning.
Results addresses how the improved performance of the participant affect orga-
nizations [13].
Kirkpatrick’s model is applied after training. The model is popular and still
widely used among organizations. The main strength of the model is the focus
on behavioral outcomes of the participants [13,23].
Quizzes can be used to measure learning in Kirkpatrick’s model. A quiz can
be thought of as a survey, i.e. a quantitative method to collect data. The quiz,
which must be taken both before and after training, consists of closed-ended
questions. Participants can choose from a set of answers, where either one or
more are correct. Participants can answer closed-ended questions fast and they
can get instant feedback when they have taken the quiz. Another reason for
using this type of question is that it is easy to analyze [19]. The quiz must be
constructed in such a way that it measures the three levels of security awareness.
A survey can also be used to measure reaction in Kirkpatrick’s model. The
survey to measure this level consists of questions answered by a likert-scale
and open questions. The likert-scale questions should give an indication of how
relevant the participants find the e-learning. The open questions can help to
discover unforeseen findings, and are essential to understand how the target
group perceive the training [19].
4 Pilot Study: Digital Election Secretaries in the Election
Context
In connection with the European Parliament election conducted in Denmark on
26th May, 2019, a group of election officials employed by Copenhagen municipal-
ity, called digital election secretaries, partook in cybersecurity awareness train-
ing. The staff at each polling station includes one digital election secretary, who
is responsible for all computer equipment that is used in a polling station, that
is, a digital voter identification system and a digital results transmission system.
In Denmark, ballots are not interpreted and stored digitally, only the result of
precinct-level tabulation is. The scope of our pilot was limited to cybersecurity
awareness training with respect to the digital voter identification system. It was
the first time that election officials had received any role-based cybersecurity
training to recognize and act on attacks happening at the polling stations. The
objective of our pilot study was to measure the improvement of their cybersecu-
rity awareness.
4.1 Target Group
Copenhagen municipality has 53 digital election secretaries, one for each polling
station. The main responsibilities of this group is to secure the equipment at the
polling station and the electoral register including all the data in the above men-
tioned register. The digital election secretaries are recruited within the workers
204 C. Schürmann et al.
of the municipality and differ in age and background. Some have served in the
role of digital election secretary several times before. Despite the demographic
differences, the group is highly homogeneous in the tasks they perform on elec-
tion day. They will spend election day in similar environments, the different
polling stations, and work with the same kind of election technologies, including
the electoral register.
4.2 Risk Assessment
We conducted a detailed risk assessment of the processes connected with the dig-
ital election secretaries on election day, and identified a set of potential objectives
of a hypothetical adversary. We consider confidentiality, integrity, and availabil-
ity in turn.
Confidentiality: We consider an attacker who aims to get unauthorized access
to information. If published by the attacker, it would weaken the trust in the
security of the election and violate this security goal. It is the digital election
secretaries’ responsibility to protect voters’ data at the polling stations and will,
therefore, be considered in our cybersecurity awareness training.
Integrity: We consider an attacker who could try to violate election integrity by
voting multiple times with the goal to change the election result in his or her
favor. This is very difficult achieve given the organization of a Danish national
election as several checks and balances were put in place for this not to happen.
For example, every voter receives a voting card in the mail which they will have
to bring to the polling station. All voting cards will be kept until the end of
voting day and then counted to validate the number of votes cast. Once a voter
is identified in the polling station, the physical poll book or in the electoral
register will be updated, the former only if the electoral register fails. However,
it is the digital election secretary’s responsibility to ensure that no one voted
more than once, and will hence be considered in our cybersecurity awareness
training.
Availability: The attacker’s objective could be to weaken public confidence in the
voting process, by trying to make headlines in the press or on social media. To
succeed, the attacker would have to break one or more security goals, for example,
by rendering the electoral register at a polling station unavailable/unusable. To
protect this asset, again, lies within the responsibilities of the digital election
secretary and will hence be considered in our cybersecurity awareness training.
4.3 Threat Modeling
Based on the analysis in the previous section, we focus on all security goals, in
particular an attacker’s intent to weaken public confidence. We exclude insider
attacks from our threat model. To succeed, the attacker would have to break one
or more security goals, and it does not matter which one(s). With this objective
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Fig. 4. Root and first level of the attack tree (Color figure online)
in mind, we develop an attack tree of the election system from the vantage point
of a digital election secretary.
Together with election experts from Copenhagen municipality, we identified
88 possible attack scenarios leaving us with an attack tree too large to include
in this paper. The full attack tree can be found on the project’s homepage1.
Figure 4 depicts the top two levels of the attack tree. The leftmost singleton
subtree (shaded in grey) states that a possible attack would be an attacker
crying wolf and claiming that the election is under attack. Clearly, the digital
election secretaries cannot stop people from lying, but still, such circumstances
may arise, and the digital election secretary would need to know how to react.
Hence, this must be a part of the cybersecurity awareness training.
The other three subtrees, describe ways on how an attacker could conceiv-
able vote twice, gain access to privileged information, or alter the information
stored in the electoral register. In the interest of space, we comment only the
second subtree that is depicted in Fig. 5. In our estimation, this attack is highly
hypothetical and very difficult to execute. The nodes of the subtree are largely
self-explanatory, except perhaps the unit that is called PCA, which refers to
the laptop named “A” that contains the binding version of the digital electoral
roll. In general, the polling place consists of several (through wired Ethernet)
networked laptops. This network is not connected to other networks including
the Internet during operation, but has been during configuration.
4.4 Training Materials
In our pilot study, we considered the entire attack tree1, tagged the inner nodes,
normalized to obtain attack/tag-chain pairs, prioritized them, and used this
knowledge as input for the design of training materials. The training materials,
which were created throughout a two months period, consist of an e-learning
website with several modules and videos. The course page is online an can be
accessed under https://valgsikkerhed.dk.2 All 53 digital election secretaries were
1 See https://www.demtech.dk/training/.
2 The website is online, and anyone interested can make an account and access the
teaching materials. Note, that the website is only in Danish.
206 C. Schürmann et al.
Fig. 5. Subtree 2: vote twice
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invited to complete the e-learning course at their own pace and in their own time.
Participating in the training was not mandatory.
All potential attacks are based on social engineering techniques aiming to
coerce employees to retrieve desired confidential information or execute an attack
on behalf of the adversary. Some potential attacks include also elements of man-
in-the-middle attacks. Our training material therefore includes modules aimed
to explain both, social engineering and man-in-the-middle attacks. The video
on man-in-the-middle discusses devices that should not be present at polling
stations, and how to react if they are spotted. The social-engineering videos focus
on attacks that could be conducted before election day or at polling stations,
i.e. exploiting common human traits resulting in that employees give access to
confidential information to people with authority, follow instructions in phishing
e-mails or gain access to any of the networked PCs in particular PCA, by creating
a distraction. The training materials even include guidelines on how to calm
worried voters in the case of an imminent cyberattack.
4.5 Evaluating E-learning
Learning Outcome. To evaluate if the digital election secretaries had gained
cybersecurity awareness, they were tested both before and after the training with
the same questionnaire.
The questionnaire was designed in such a way that each level of awareness
was covered by more than one question. It is designed with reaction and learning
levels from Kirkpatrick’s model in mind. Since we are not measuring long term
effects, there is no reason to evaluate the participants changed behavior nor how
their changed behavior affect the organizations they work for.
77.4% of the target group signed up to the platform but only 71.7% completed
the e-learning training. That means that 92% of those who started the e-learning
finished it. The distribution of the grades can be seen in Fig. 6.
Fig. 6. Distribution of the grades before and after training.
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A paired t-test can be used to check if the learning is effective by comparing
before and after observations. This is done to show that there is statistical evi-
dence that the difference of the means between the paired samples is significantly
different from zero [12].
In order to do a paired t-test on this small data set, one need to make sure
that the data is normally distributed. This was tested with a Q-Q Plot, that can
be seen in Fig. 7. It shows that the data is, indeed, normally distributed.
Fig. 7. Q-Q plot of data.
The t-test is run with the following hypotheses:
H0 : μd = 0 (1)
H1 : μd = 0 (2)
In other words, H 0 assumes that the security awareness training has no
effect on the mean and the alternative hypothesis, H 1 assumes that there is a
difference.
The grades before and after were used to run the paired t-test. Since the
participants can also score less than before we do a two-tailed test.
SPSS is a widely used statics application created by IBM [10] and was used
to run the paired t-test. The test was run with α = 0.05. The result of the test
is shown in Fig. 8. As can be seen in the figure the digital election secretaries
score, on average 1.6 points higher in the latter quiz. It also shows that the Sig.
(2-tailed), also called the p-value, is much smaller than α. This means that we
can reject the null-hypothesis.
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Fig. 8. Paired t-test results
To evaluate the awareness layers, as mentioned in [21], they are translated to
this specific context. Perception is getting the digital election secretaries recog-
nizing and understanding potential security risks in an election. Comprehension
is to teach them to take in information from multiple sources, interpret them
and be able to pass on information that can help others actors in the election.
Projection is for them to be able to prevent future attacks.
The results in Table 1 shows that all the three levels of successful security
awareness training was reached for the election officials that participated in the
e-learning training.
Table 1. Table of scores for the three levels of security awareness
Awareness level Before After t(37) p
Perception M = 1.45, SD = 0.57 M = 1.64, SD = 0.49 −2.113 0.041
Comprehension M = 2.24, SD = 0.75 M = 2.237, SD = 0.41 −4.112 0.00209
Projection M = 3.3, SD = 0.89 M = 4.15, SD = 0.59 −5.929 0.0000007835
An analysis on the time spent on the quizzes, shows that the participants
spend on average 4 min less on the latter quiz. However, we can not draw any
conclusion by that in itself as we decided to give the participant the freedom to
do the training at their own pace. Hence we have not measured the individual
questions in the quizzes and, therefore, do not know how which questions they
spend less time on in the latter quiz. We leave this to future work.
Participant Evaluation. 52.6% gave feedback on their experience of the e-
learning. 85% said that they felt they had either gained new knowledge or
refreshed knowledge they already had. 85% also said that they thought the con-
tent of the e-learning was good and relevant for their duties as digital election
secretaries.
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5 Conclusion
This paper provides a methodology for designing and delivering cybersecurity
awareness training for short-term retention. The methodology was tested on 53
digital election secretaries who were deployed to 53 polling stations in Copen-
hagen municipality during the European Parliament election in 2019. We have
evaluated the training using Kirkpatrick’s model of evaluation found it to be
effective. We are certain that our methodology carries over directly to the other
97 Danish municipalities, as their elections are organized in a manner similar to
those in Copenhagen. We also believe that it is applicable beyond Denmark, as
other European countries use digital voter identification and results transmission
systems. The training material must be updated and adjusted to the respective
target audiences and the specific technologies in use in a particular location.
Through understanding of the target group, the adversarial environment and
the attack surface it was possible to create training materials tailored toward
the job of the digital election secretaries. The training was delivered through
a custom-made e-learning platform, containing short videos to deliver individ-
ual modules derived from potential attacks identified using attack trees. After
training, we demonstrated that the target group reached all levels of success-
ful security awareness: perception, comprehension and projection. In addition, a
training evaluation showed that (1) the digital election secretaries perceived the
training to be both good and relevant for their work on election day and (2) they
also felt that they gained or at least refreshed their cyber security knowledge.
In future work, we would like to collect more evidence that this is a sus-
tainable methodology to design and conduct cybersecurity awareness training.
Firstly, we would like to compare a group that has been trained with a group
that has not been trained to identify the difference, if any. Secondly, it would
be interesting to analyze time spent on each task and correlate with retention
of the concepts associated with each task. Hence do a more granular evalua-
tion of the cyber security awareness training. Thirdly, we would like to conduct
similar awareness training with the same group of digital election security at
future elections to identify trends in the evaluation data. Fourthly, we would
like to broaden the pilot to the whole of Denmark to examine if we can repro-
duce our results. Lastly, we believe that it would be interesting to apply the
same methodology to elections in other countries and/or broaden cybersecurity
awareness training beyond the elections to other sectors as well to study the
robustness of the methodology.
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